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FORUM
The Fight Against Global Terrorism:
Self-Defense or Collective Security as International Police Action?




Few acts of international violence and the reaction to them have triggered a more
intense international legal debate than the heinous terrorist attacks on the New
York World Trade Center, the Twin Towers, and the United States Department of
Defense, the Pentagon. Numerous articles and comments have been written in in-
ternational legal journals and leading newspapers or have been communicated to the
public via the internet.' This intense debate was certainly triggered by the unprece-
dented way by which this horrendous act of terror was carried out, i.e. the use of
four hijacked civilian aircrafts, with hundreds of passengers on board, as a means of
'See, inter alia, Christian Tomuscha, Der 11. September und seine rechtlichen Konsequen-
zen, Europiische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ), vol. 28, 2001, 535; Christian Tietje/
Karsten Nowrot, V6lkerrechtliche Aspekte militirischer Ma.gnahmen gegen den internationa-
len Terrorismus, Neue Zeitschrift fir Wehrrecht, 2002, 1; Thomas Bruha/Matthias Bortfeld,
Terrorismus und Selbstverteidigung, Vereinte Nationen (VN), vol. 49,2001, 161;JasperFinke/
Christiane Wandscher, Terrorismusbekimpfung jenseits militarischer Gewalt, VN, vol. 49,
2001,168; Nico Schriver, Responding to International Terrorism: Moving the Frontiers of In-
ternational Law for 'Enduring Freedom'?, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR),
vol. 48, 2001, 371; Alain Pellet, No, This is not 'War', available at: http://www.ejil.org/
forumWTC/; Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Categories of In-
ternational Law, id; Carsten Stalin, Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001):
What They Say and What They Do not Say; id.;FrdericMegret 'War'? Legal Semantics and
the Move to Violence, id.; Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense Was There an 'Armed Attack'?, id;
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Law after the Destruction of the Towers, id; Terrorist Attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, ASIL Insights, with contributions by Frederic L.
Kirgis, Gregory H Fox, Jordan Paust, John Cerone, Arnold N Pronto, B. Welling Halland
SaidMamoud; available at: http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm.
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mass destruction. Furthermore, the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon
were immediately understood by the public as attacks on two symbols of Western/
American economic and military power and thus as attacks on not only the United
States but also on the civilized world in general. Last but not least, the fact that the
attacks, causing the death of thousands of civilians - mainly from the United States
but also from many other countries -, were carried out by a relatively small group
of terrorists right under the eyes of the public around the world, contributed to the
almost universal involvement in the debate over the causes and the moral, political,
and legal implications of this act of terror.2 But the extraordinary concern of the in-
ternational legal community with the events of 11 September 2001 also has to do
with the fact that the extent and impact of the terrorist attacks by private individu-
als (although also supported by the governments of a few states) has brought to light
the new dimensions of the threats of violence by a non-territorialized, borderless
global terrorism that clearly transcends not only the traditional but also the modern
concepts of international warfare.' As Christian Tomuschat in his recent lucid and
comprehensive article on "Der 11. September 2001 und seine rechtlichen Konse-
quenzen" (September 11 and its Legal Consequences, translation by the author) has
aptly observed: New challenges and new dangers require new answers It is exactly
this aspect of the attacks of September 11 that shall be addressed in the following
paper. The focus will be on the critical question whether the responses to the at-
tacks by the US-lead world-wide coalition against terrorism properly fit the legal
preconditions and requirements for the lawful exercise of individual or collective
self-defense and the political implications that will or could entail from the present
strategy followed by the United States and the coalition (C.). The paper will also
discuss the collective, United Nations based efforts to rebuild Afghanistan as a
viable lawful state, and it will ultimately discuss whether there may have been a
viable alternative approach to the undoubtedly necessary enforcement measures
based on the principle of collective or individual self-defense, thereby testing
whether a truly new answer to the new threat scenarios could be conceived of and
what its political consequences, particularly for the future campaign against global
' In this regard the September 11 attacks differ from other desastrous events that causedeven
more casualties - like the air raid on Dresden - but occurred as part of interstate war by mili-
tary forces or - like at Pearl Harbor - as an act of aggression by military forces on the order of
the Japanese Government.
' For an excellent account of the events of 11 September in the light of the process of
globalization see DavidHeld, Violence, Law and Justice in a Global Age, Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies, vol.9,2002 (forthcoming); also available at: http://www.ssrc.org/septiI/
essays/held.htm; for an earlier comprehensive analysis of the impact of globalization on the
concepts of war and violence see Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 1998; id, Recon-
ceptualizing organized violence, in: Daniele Archibugi/Da vidHeld/Martin Kohler (eds.), Re-
imagining Political Community, 1998, 91.
'Tomuschat(note 1), 535.
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terrorism, could be expected to be (D.). At the beginning, however, a few method-
ological remarks are in place (B.), since in dealing with highly sensitive political
problems, the international jurist faces the dilemma that he or she has to rely on the
available information that is necessarily incomplete and sometimes even tenuous
because the national and international decision-making process, as matter of course,
is not open to the public.
5
B. Methodological Prolegomena
Besides the problem of a potential or actual informational gap that the interna-
tional jurist faces, there are further methodological problems that need to be ad-
dressed before going into the substantive argument. One is that the outcome of the
legal assessment of the responses to the September 11 attacks undertaken by the
United States and the coalition and - to some extent - by the United Nations de-
pends on whether one looks at these actions from an ex ante or from a later point
of time like, for instance, the time when such assessment is made. In the first alter-
native, the assessment has to be based on the facts and the information available to
the decision-makers as well as to the assessing writer at that earlier time. A later
critique would have to assess the earlier evaluations without taking cognizance of in-
formation disclosed later. For example, to resort to an act of self-defense presup-
poses a clear knowledge as to who is the attacking state or other actor. In the early
days following the attack on the Twin Towers, that was not clear at all. Thus, some
authors writing just about two weeks after the event vigorously denied that the at-
tack by the highjackers brought about a state of war as hitherto defined by interna-
tional law.6 Other writers clearly indicated that the attacks were of a novel charac-
ter, but argued that we were witnessing a widening of the concept of self-defense
that is now to include 'armed attacks' by non-state actors like terrorists.'Today we
know more about the involvement of the Taliban regime in the support of the ter-
rorists, thus the legal argument can be made on somewhat firmer ground. Still,
there is no clear-cut answer to the question from which point of time - ex ante or
a later date - the legal assessment of given countermeasures is to be undertaken. The
Correctly Tomuschat (note 1), 535.
6 See Pellet (note 1), arguing that the attacks did not constitute war; Cassese (note 1) observ-
ing that 'war' in this case is a "misnomer"; this is also clearly stated by Tomuschar (note 1), 536;
Paust (note 1) who, however, argues that self-defense according to Art. 51 UN Charter extends
to attacks by non-state actors.
'Whether the argument of an ongoing change of the meaning of the concept of self-defense
is a tenable position to take need not be decided at this point. The fact is that this argument
reflects the insecurity of the respective authors with regard to the factual situation obtaining
at the time of their legal assessment: could the attacks be attributed to a state and could the
attacks be classified as 'armed attack' in the sense of Art. 51 UN Charter?
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most reasonable approach appears to be that the assessment should be based on the
available information at the time of writing and thereby accepting the risk of error.
The present paper will follow this approach.!
A last methodological point needs to be mentioned here. Assessing the legality
and legitimacy of countermeasures against terrorists, like any legal assessment of
given actions, necessarily involves value judgments or - more modestly put - polit-
ical determinations as to the adequacy of the actions taken. This is particularly true
in cases where the subject matter discussed is of extreme political sensitivity like it
is the case with regard to the September 11 attacks that rightly have caused great
outrage. One may - as a matter of principle - object that political considerations or
subjective value judgments have no place in scholarly legal arguments. However, as
much research into the process of legal decision-making has shown, legal determina-
tions are - all honest efforts to abide by the highest standards of legal craftsmanship
notwithstanding - invariably influenced by the preconceptions of the person apply-
ing the law.' This is particularly true with regard to international law, which has
been referred to as a political law, 10 meaning that it has a special proximity to inter-
national politics as it deals with the political relations of sovereign states. Thus,
international jurists are not discussing state actions in a political vacuum but are cer-
tainly influenced by the political environment in which they work. This does not
mean that their legal assessments of certain state actions or other international
events are simply political statements in legal disguise. But it is important that the
international legal discourse remains transparent in the sense that the individual
writer lays open her or his political and conceptual perspectives in order to provide
for the opportunity of other participants in the discourse to know the preconcep-
tions from which approaches he or she develops the argument. The present author
is firmly convinced that global terrorism as a crime against humanity has to be met
with a collective complex response that is commensurate to the novel character of
global terrorist violence. This response ranges from international collective police
action to bring the individual terrorists to justice, to collective enforcement action
under the authority of the United Nations against such states that actively support
terrorism, to individual and collective self-defense, and at the same time to collective
actions to address the root causes of global terrorism that ultimately can be traced
'Following the same line Tomuschar (note 1), 535.
'See JosefEsser, Vorverstindnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung, 2nd ed., 1972.
10 Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, in: id (ed.), Vilkerrecht, 2nd ed., 2001, 8; Louis Henkin, in:
Louis Henkin/Lori F Damrosch/Pdchard C Pugh/Oscar Schachrer/H Smit, International
Law, 4th ed., 2001, 1; along the same line with slightly different terminology Alfred Verdross/
Bruno Simma, Vo1kerrecht, 3rd ed., 1984, 17; Hanspeter Neuhold, in: Neuhold/Waldemar
Hummer/Christoph Schreuer (eds.), Osterreichisches Handbuch des V6lkerrechts, 3rd ed.,
1997, note 1; Georg Dabm/Jost Delbruck/Rii 'ger Woifrum, V61kerrecht, 2nd ed., 1989,
Vol.I/1, 28.
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back to a complex mix of grave social and economic disparities, to fears of loss of
cultural identity of particular nations under the impact of globalization, and to
related ideological and religious fundamentalisms. The following sections will ad-
dress some important concerns with regard to the argument that the present re-
sponse to the September 11 attacks can be clearly based on self-defense and will then
argue why future actions need to be carried out under the auspices of the United
Nations for legal as well as political grounds.11
C. The Self-Defense Argument
I. One of the fundamental principles of modern international law is the prohibi-
tion "of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations" as it is provided for in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter (hereinafter:
UNCh) and is also recognized as a basic principle of customary international law. 2
The military action taken by the United States and Great Britain with the logistic
support of several other states undoubtedly constitutes the use of force against
another state, it would therefore be in breach of Art. 2 (4) UNCh unless it is justi-
fied by one of the exceptions by which use of force is permissible, i.e. either as an
enforcement action under Chapter VII UNCh or as an act of self-defense under Art.
51 UNCh."3 There is general agreement that the present military action against the
Taliban regime (and thereby against Afghanistan) and the Al'Qaida network under
the leadership of Osama Bin Laden is not an enforcement measure under Chapter
VII. Although the Security Council in Resolutions 1368 and 137314 expressly deter-
mined that the September 11 attacks constituted a threat to international peace, and
stated in Resolution 1373 that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Council did not decide on any enforcement measures under Chapter VII, nor did it
expressly authorize certain states to undertake such enforcement action, unlike in
Resolution 678 in the case of the Iraqui aggression against Kuwait. 5 Thus, only self-
"In the same vein see M6gret (note 1), section 3, 2.
'
2 See AlbrechtRandelzhofer, Art. 2 (4), note 58, in: Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter
of the United Nations - A Commentary, 1995 with extensive further references.
3 Correctly Tietje/Nowrot (note 1), 4.
4 For the text of these resolutions see SC Res. 1368 of 12 September 2001; and SC Res. 1373
of 28 September 2001; a German translation of the resolutions is reproduced in: VN, vol. 49,
2001, 197 et seq., and 198 et seq.
" On this point see the detailed analysis of the wording of Resolutions 1368 and 1373 offered
by Stahn (note 1), section 3, 1, who correctly observes that Resolution 1373 differs from
Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 where the Council, acting under Chapter VII, expressly
authorized "Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait ... to use all necessary
means to uphold and to implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
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defense remains as the sole ground for justifying the present military actions that be-
gan on 7 October 2001.16
As a preliminary point, it has to be clarified which precisely is the legal basis of
the right to self-defense. This is necessary because there is some controversy over
the question whether the right to self-defense under Art. 51 UNCh supersedes the
right to self-defense under customary international law, and whether both rights are
identical in scope or not. 7 Allegedly, there is an advantage in relying on the custom-
ary right to self-defense because it offers a wider range of responses against the ene-
my in that it permits self-defense against hostile acts short of an armed attack, par-
ticularly against an imminent threat of an armed attack, i.e. preventive self-defense. 8
Others maintain that Art. 51 UNCh deliberately restricted self-defense to the
occurrence of an armed attack in order to foreclose or at least minimize an abuse of
the right to self-defense. 9 In addition, it has been correctly pointed out that member
states of the United Nations are bound by Art. 51 UNCh as a provision of a treaty
to which they are a party." Be that as it may, in the instant case it is clear that the
United States as well as Great Britain are relying on Art. 51 UNCh since they have
expressly said so in a letter to the Security Council.2
and to restore international peace and security in the area." No such language is used in Resolu-
tion 1373.
16 See Tomuschar (note 1), 538, 540; it is worth mentioning that the Seucrity Council did not
expressly authorize measures of self-defense, either. It merely 'reaffirmed' the inherent right to
self-defense in the preamble of resolutions 1368 and 1373 and only reffered to the attacks, like
all other acts of international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. It did not
classify the attacks as 'armed attacks,' thus using a much more restricted language than, for in-
stance, in Resolutions 660 of 2 August 1990 and 678 of 29 November 1990 concerning the
Iraqui invasion of Kuwait; see Stalin (note 1), section 3, 1 et seq.; Migret (note 19), section 3,
3. Of course, the exercise of self-defense does not need Security Council authorization, but an
explicit authorization would have added to the legitimacy of the self-defense measures taken.
" For a detailed discussion of the problem see Randelzhofer (note 12), note 38 et seq.; Kevin
C. Kenny, Self-Defence, in: Ruijger Wolfrum (ed.), United Nations Law, Policies and Practice,
2nd ed. 1995, notes 6 et seq.; Yoran Dinsrein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 2nd ed., 1994,
175 er seq.
" See Randelzhofer (note 12), note 39; for a detailed discussion of this question see also
Dinstein (note 17), 179 et seq.
"See Dinstein (note 17); Kenny (note 17), note 8.
20Randelzhofer (note 12), note 40.
21 See Press Statement on Terrorist Threats by Security Council President of 8 October 2001,
available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/afg152.doc.htm; and Office of the
Press Secretary, Press Briefing by AriFleischer, 31 October 2001: "We're acting in self-defense
in the finest traditions that set our nation apart from most other nations"; see also Stahn
(note 1), section 3, 3; Megret (note 1), section 3, 1.
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The lawful exercise of self-defense according to Art. 51 UNCH requires, first of
all, that an armed attack against a member state has been undertaken. Art. 51 UNCh
is silent on the question as to who has to launch an armed attack that could trigger
the exercise of self-defense. Traditionally, it has been assumed that Art. 51 UNCh
had to be read as meaning the armed attack had to come from another state. 22 It can
be assumed that the authors of the UN Charter, indeed, had this scenario in mind,
but as a matter of fact, Art. 51 UNCh does not say so. Yet, the United States and
Great Britain as well as many authors have taken great pains to establish that the
terrorist attack was ultimately related to a state, 1'e. Afghanistan.23 Although not
relevant with regard to the status of the attacker as such, the problem of state
involvement is crucial in the sense that self-defense against a non-state actor not always
but in most cases will necessitate carring out measures of self-defense in the territory
of a state where the attackers are headquartered or have taken refuge. Given the
voluminous anti-terrorism conventions and even more numerous determinations by
the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly to the effect 24 that states
supporting, harboring or tolerating terrorists are in violation of the fundamental
obligation to suppress and eliminate international terrorism, it is a tenable position
that the Taliban regime is sufficiently involved in such illegal actions to be held
responsible and therefore subject to the consequences of acts of self-defense.25
22 This traditional perspective is clearly reflected in the Definition of Aggression, adopted
by the UN General Assembly GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) on 14 December 1974. Art. 1 defines ag-
gression as "the use of force by a State against the sovereignty, terrorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another State ... " and an explanatory note (a) adds that the term 'State' "is used
without prejudice to questions of recognition," thus indicating that de facto regimes are includ-
ed; see also Tomuschat (note 1), 540 with further references.
23 The United States and Great Britain took great pains to present conclusive evidence to the
Security Council of the involvement of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the support of the
terrorist activities by AI'Qaida under the leadership of OsamaBin Laden, evidence that satisfied
the Security Council, see Press release of 8 October 2001, UN Doc. SC/7167. For a critical assess-
ment of the standards of proof applied by the Security Council see Mgret (note 1), section 4,
5. A careful argument establishing the responsibility of the Taliban regime/Afghanistan is offered
by Tietje/Nowrot (note 1), 6 et seq. with further references.
" Up to now there are nineteen international conventions against terrorism and, in addition,
the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly time and again have condemned
terrorism, for a complete survey see Schriver (note 1), 274 et seq.; the most far-reaching con-
ventions are the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, GA
Res. 52/164 of 15 December 1997, Annex, and the International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Financing of Terrorism, GA Res. 54/109 of 9 December 1999, the latter being
'legislated' with binding force by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII UNCh with
SC Res. 1373 (2001); see also Tomuschat (note 1), 537; for the history of the campaign against
international terrorism see also Tietje/Nowrot (note 1), 1 et seq.
25 See Tomuschat (note 1), 541; Tietje/Nowrot (note 1), 6 et seq.; Kirgis (note 1); Paust
(note 1); with some caveats also Cerone (note 1).
Jost Delbrick
It is much easier to make the argument that the terrorist attack of September 11
amounts to an armed attack. Although perpetrated by private individuals and not
by military units or other means, it cannot be disputed that turning an almost fully
fueled big airliner like a guided missile into the Towers and the Pentagon, causing
an immense destruction of lives of thousands of people, constitutes an armed attack
in the sense of Art. 51 UNCh. Although not expressly mentioned in Art. 51 UNCh,
the very idea of self-defense as a means of self-help requires a "necessity of self-
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of de-
liberation. "26 From this widely accepted definition, it has been concluded that self-
defense contains an element of immediacy, but it is also agreed upon that the
defending state has to be given a reasonable time to decide on the appropriate
measures to be taken.27 In the present context, the lapse of little over three weeks be-
tween the attack and the beginning of the military action by the United States and
Great Britain does not appear unreasonably long in view of the gravity of the attack
on the one side and the large scale use of force to be applied. Seen in a larger con-
text, the question of self-defense and time raises concerns that will be addressed later
on.28 Thus, it appears that the requirements of the applicability of Art. 51 UNCh
are fullfilled with the proviso, though, that the measures of self-defense have to stay
within the bounds set by the principle of proportionality and the rules of inter-
national humanitarian law. Like in the case of the Kosovo intervention, this is a
critical point because the massive use of air raids and the use of particularly destruc-
tive munitions always carry the danger that the so-called collateral damages, j*e the
infliction of death and serious injuries to civilians and damages to non-military in-
stallations, become disproportionate despite all efforts to avoid such impacts.29
26 The Carohneincident 1837, statement by US Secretary of State Daniel Websterin the dip-
lomatic correspondence ensuing from the incident, see Correspondence between Great Britain
and the United States, respecting the Destruction of the Caroline, British and Foreign State
Papers, vol. 26 (1837-1838), 1372-1377, vol. 29 (1840-1841), 1126-1142, vol. 30 (1841-1842),
193-202; see Werner Meng, The Caroline, in: RudolfBernhardt et a. (eds.), Encyclopedia of
Public International Law (EPIL), vol. I, 1992, 537 et seq.; see also Sir Robert jennings/Sir
Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, vol. I/1, 9th ed., 1992, 421.
27 It has to be noted, though, that the longer the time span between the attack and the
response, the more such defensive response gets 'dangerously' close to look like an armed re-
prisal, see Migret (note 1), section 4, 1, which is not permissible under Art. 2(4) UNCh; on the
necessity of distinguishing between measures of self-defense and armed reprisals see Jennings/
Watts (note 26), note 419; on reprisals by use of force see KarlJosefPartsch, Reprisals, in: EPIL
(note 20), vol. IV, 2000, 200, 202.
28 See on this problem M6gret (note 1), section 4, 1 et seq.
z' According to the available information, the United States and Britain tried to take great
care to avoid disproportianate collateral damages. Yet there were also reports on missiles having
gone astray hitting civilians and non-military objects such as a UN relief center, see Archiv der
Gegenwart, vol. 71/11, 2001.
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In addition, Art. 51 UNCh provides that the exercise of self-defense is limited to
such time "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security."
In order to enable the Security Council to react, Art. 51 UNCh also requires that
the Council shall be informed immediately of the measures taken by the defending
state. The latter requirement was fulfilled by the United States and Great Britain.30
It could be argued, however, that the Security Council did take action itself. In
Resolution 1373, the Council, in the operative part of the Resolution, decided on a
large number of measures that should be undertaken by the UN Member States.
Particularly, in paragraph 3 c), the Council called upon all states to cooperate within
the framework of bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements in order
"to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of
such acts." While couched in terms that deviate from earlier authorizations by the
Security Council of states members to take enforcement measures under Chap-
ter VII, taken by itself, this section of Resolution 1373 could be taken as a mandate
for the states members to take the necessary measures to ensure the implementation
of this and earlier resolutions on the elimination of terrorism. However, as has been
convincingly argued, the context in which this section is set out, Le. within the list
of non-forcible measures to be undertaken by the states members, it is unlikely that
it could be interpreted as an action by the Security Council within the meaning of
Art. 51 UNCh. Thus, it appears that no preemptive action by the Council was
taken. In turn, this means that the military action by the United States and Great
Britain, taken on face value, conforms to the requirements of Art. 51 UNCh.
II. Although the case for the legal and legitimate exercise appears to be water-
proof, some intriguing problems remain: First, there is the problem that the mili-
tary action by the United States (and obviously also by Great Britain) aimed at the
destruction of the Al'Qaida strongholds in Afghanistan and at the arrest of its
leader, Osama Bin Laden. But soon after the military actions got under way, this
limited goal of the operations changed to the broader aim of deposing of the Taliban
regime itself. Of course, there are many good reasons to do away with a clearly dic-
tatorial regime that undoubtedly displayed a persistent pattern of gross violations of
fundamental human rights, particularly against women and children. The question
is, however, whether this goal could be legally pursued as a measure of self-defense
under Art. 51 UNCh.31 The exercise of self-defense aims at repelling the armed at-
tack of another state or entity and also at incapacitating the enemy to renew its
attacks. To depose of the - however illegitimate - government of the enemy state is
of a different quality. In the present case, the situation is complicated by the fact
that the Taliban regime was not internationally recognized except by three states
30See http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/afg152.doc.htm.
' Doubts in this regard are raised by Tietje/Nowrot (note 1), 15.
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(Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia). It is significant that the Security
Council in its Resolution 1378 only expressed its support of the "efforts of the
Afghan people to replace the Taliban regime." It did not express its consent to the
same efforts on the part of the United States and Great Britain. One has to admit,
though, that the deposition of the Taliban regime could not be neatly separated
from the fight against the Al'Qaida network. Yet, doubts remain about the sound-
ness of stretching the concept of self-defense to the extent that it also covers the re-
placement of the government of the enemy state, be it only a de facto regime or not.
This problem will be addressed later on.32
Second and most importantly, there is the problem of the indeterminate charac-
ter of the present measures of self-defense in terms of time and space. As already
mentioned, the time frame of the actions against the Taliban regime and Al'Qaida
is not objectionable as regards the time span between the attacks and the beginning
of the self-defense measures if considered as an isolated event that is limited in time
and space.3 However, given the much wider goals that have been repeatedly stated
by the President of the United States34 and high officials of the Administration, 35 it
is indispensable to discuss the question of self-defense in the wider political and legal
context. With regard to the time dimension of self-defense in the present situation,
one of the most significant facts is that from the day of the attacks on the Twin
Towers and the Pentagon, the United States have unequivocally proclaimed to be at
war. After a few days this term has been replaced by the concept of a "new war."
36
Thus the use of the term 'war' or 'new war' is significant because, whether in the
legal meaning of traditional or pre-UN Charter International Law or in a non-legal,
non-technical or ordinary sense, war signifies an open-ended process - open-ended
in the sense that its end depends on whether one of the warring parties concedes de-
32 See, infra, D. I.
'3 See, supra, C. I..
3 See Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Office of the Press
Secretary, 20 September 2001, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html.
" See, for instance, Secretary of Defense DonaldRumseld, Creative Coalition Building for
a New Kind of War, New York Times, 28 September 2001: One should "forget about exit
strategies. We are looking at sustained engagement that carries no deadlines."
36 See President George Bush in his Address to the Joint Session of Congress and to the
American People (note 34) and ever since. He was joined in this terminology by the British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, who stated that" Whatever the technical or legal issues ... the fact
is we are at war with terrorism," cited from Migret (note 1), section 1, 2. Also the American
media, particularly CNN, reported about the September 11 events and the later developments
under the heading "America's New War."
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feat or the other considers the war aims to be achieved.3" If - as it is the case here -
the 'war' or 'new war' is carried on as a measure of self-defense - a concept that is
limited in time by its very nature as a measure of self-help against an actual or
clearly defined imminent attack3" - self-defense clandestinely becomes open-ended
as well. Conflating the concept of war, which in view of the prohibition of the use
of force by Art. 2(4) UNCh is not a concept legally recognized by current interna-
tional law except for its role in the ius in bello, with the concept of self-defense
amounts to nothing less than a carte blanche for the unilateraluse of force,39 and is
thus contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations that was
exactly designed to prohibit the unilateral use of force except within the limits of
self-defense."0 The so-called realists will strongly disagree with this conclusion. But
that is because other means to achieve the same end, namely the elimination of glob-
al terrorism, are not in their view, i£e. collective action under the authority of the
United Nations.
D. The Alternative Approach:
Collective Security as International Police Action?
The preceding discussion of the widely - sometimes unequivocally, sometimes
cautiously - accepted self-defense argument has shown that even going along with
a very 'liberal' construction or interpretation of Art. 51 UNCh some serious con-
cerns remain. In general, it is of little importance that international lawyers disagree
on points of law. In this case, however, there is more at stake than just an academic
controversy about some abstract legal problem. The international community as a
"' For a detailed, critical discussion on the implications of the use of the term 'war' in the
present context see Mdgret (note 1) section 1, 1 et seq. and section 4, 1 et seq.; the "open in
time" nature of the military action that began in Afghanistan is well-reflected in its code name
"enduring freedom," see id., section 4, 2.
38 It is to be noted that it means stretching the concept of self-defense if one includes the so-
called 'preventive' self-defense - a concept that is very controversial but has been acquiesced to
at times by the international community, the argument being that under specific conditions one
cannot expect the potential victim to wait for the actual agression to occur; however, the Israeli
air strike against the Iraqi nuclear plant that Israel claimed to be an act of preventive self-
defense, other uses of force against its Arabian neighbors, and the US air raid against Libya were
strongly condemned as illegal, see Tietje/Nowrot (note 1), 14 with further references.
3' Critical also Dupuy (note 1), 3.
It is significant that Tomuschat (note 1), 545, while considering the military action in
Afghanistan to be in line with Art. 51 UNCh although stretched to its extreme limits, clearly
states that the arguments supporting the legality of the Afghanistan mission would not apply
if this mission would be extended to other countries, with the consequence that Germany could
not join in with such extended military actions. For these and similar reasons, other nations
now partners in the coalition most likely will break away from the coalition that is on shaky
ground anyway.
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whole is facing a most serious challenge that is not new, in principle, but new in its
global dimension, i.e. the threat of global terrorism. Today's terrorism is as much
the result of globalization as are its positive effects that certainly can be observed,
like the unprecedented interconnectedness of peoples, groups and individuals, the
new opportunities of global communications technologies, cultural exchange etc.4
Global terrorism is deterritorialized, borderless and in a way ubiquitous. It is using
modern communications technologies and is extremely well equipped to strike
against its targets at any time anywhere with little man-power but in a neatly coordi-
nated or concerted manner, as has been shown by the September 11 attacks. 2 In this
sense, terrorist attacks are novel. They escape the traditional concepts of armed con-
flict. Thus, the response to this new threat scenario has to be a new one as well. The
starting point for an adequate strategy has to be a multifaceted, complex, and at the
same time well-coordinated, collective enterprise based on the law. For legal and
political reasons, this is not the time for unilateralism in whatever disguise. At stake
is the credibility of the vision of a just and socially responsible international civil so-
ciety under the rule of law. With this in mind the following section will first discuss
the existing legal framework based on the Charter of the United Nations and the
opportunities it holds out for an effective and longterm strategy to combat global
terrorism. Secondly, it will discuss the political advantages of such a strategy but will
also point at the price that the civilized world will have to pay for it.
I. There is widespread consensus that the fight against global terrorism clearly
necessitates law enforcement measures including military means. The long chain of
unanimously adopted Security Council Resolutions" condemning international
terrorism and mandating all states to take effective measures to prevent terrorist
attacks and to take action against the perpetrators of such acts, the various anti-ter-
rorism conventions," and last but not least the fact that the Security Council by its
Resolutions 1368, 1373, 1377, and 1378, while not expressly authorizing the use of
force, clearly accepted that military enforcement measures were undertaken,4" are a
" See David Held/Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader, 2000,
passim; DavidHeld/AnthonyMcGrew/DavidGoldblat/JonathanPerraton, Global Transfor-
mations: Politics, Economics and Culture, 1999, passim.
42 See James M Smith/William C Thomas (eds.), The Terrorism Threat and U.S.
Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors, 2001, available at: http://
www.usafa.af.mil/inss/.
413 SC Res. 748 of 31 March 1992; SC Res. 1044 of 31 January 1996; SC Res. 1054 of 26 April
1996; SC Res. 1070 of 16 August 1996; SC Res. 1160 of 31 March 1998; SC Res. 1199 of 23
September 1998; SC Res. 1203 of 24 October 1998; SC Res. 1214 of 8 December 1998; SC Res.
1267 of 15 October 1999; and SC Res. 1333 of 19 December 2000.
"See the enumeration by Schrijver (note 1), 274.
4 See also the statement made by UN Secretary General KohiAnnan on 8 October 2001,
where he indicated that the military action in Afghanistan was fully in line with the right to
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clear indication of the consensus. It appears from this record, that there has been a
chance not to base the military actions in Afghanistan on self-defense but rather on
Chapter VII UNCh. Indeed, the main prerequisite for enforcement action under
Chapter VII - the determination of a threat to international peace and security ac-
cording to Art. 39 UNCh - had been met by Security Council Resolution 1373 in
that it expressly determined that the terrorist attacks constituted a threat to interna-
tional peace security,46 and that therefore the Council, in adopting this binding
Resolution, was acting under Chapter VII.4 In addition, one may point to the re-
peatedly stated resolve of the Council to take all necessary steps to combat interna-
tional terrorism.48 Since the political decisions opted for self-defense, the preceding
observations are irrelevant with regard to the Afghanistan mission. They are highly
relevant for any future military actions that might become necessary and therefore
should be seriously considered.49 The reasons for this are both legal and political. In
legal terms, enforcement measures under Chapter VII and based on a clear and well
defined mandate from the Security Council are free of the doubts and questionable
4stretchings' of the law that surround the present self-defense approach. In addition,
enforcement measures under Chapter VII could pursue aims that would not be
covered by self-defense even if stretched to the extreme. If a regime is responsible for
grave and persistent violations of human rights, including the support of terrorists
who on their part ire preparing or committing crimes against humanity, the Secu-
rity Council, following its well-established practice of determining serious human
rights violations within a given country to constitute a threat to international peace
and security, s5 could authorize enforcement measures against that country. Had one
followed that approach, questions about the legality of the deposition of the Taliban
in the course of the self-defense actions would have been clearly unfounded.
self-defense, Press Release of 8 October 2001, available at: http//www.un.org/News/dh/
20011008.htm.
46See, for instance, the third invocation of the preamble of Resolution 1373 of 28 September
2001.
' See Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 at the end of the preamble.
4' See Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001, section 5 of the operative part.
4
' In favor of pursuing the fight against global terrorism under the authority of the United
Nations, Mgret (note 1), section 6, 5 et seq., who considers the Security Council the most
appropriate authority to ward off an increase in unilateralism, all its shortcomings (like its non-
representative composition) notwithstanding; underlining the importance of Security Council
involvement Dupuy(note 1).
" On this practice seeJostDelbiick, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention under the
authority of the United Nations, Indiana Law Journal (ILJ), vol. 67, 1992, 867 et seq.; id., A
More Effective International Law or a "New World Law"? - Some Aspects of the Development
of International Law in a Changing International System, ILJ, vol. 68, 1993, 705 et seq.
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In political terms, basing the fight against global terrorism on collective actions
under Chapter VII has major advantages as well. Whether one likes it or not, the
United States has been and still is the number one target of global terrorism. This
has to do with a number of reasons, among which are its exposed role as the only
superpower and the exponent of the so-called Western life styles which are impact-
ing the world over. In addition, instances of legally questionable power projections"'
have contributed to the widespread anti-Americanism. If future enforcement mea-
sures against terrorism would be carried out under the authority of the United
Nations, these measures would considerably gain in legitimacy. But more impor-
tantly, the acceptance of this approach by the United States would send out a
politically weighty signal that it is willing to exercise its highly necessary leadership
as an integral part of the anti-terrorism coalition. This coalition, in turn, would be
greatly strengthened because particularly the less enthusiastic members are likely to
stand by the coalition more firmly. In this context it is significant to note that, for
instance, Pakistan, which had to overcome major political hurdles in joining the
coalition, repeatedly and publicly relied on Resolutions 1368 and 1373 as a legitima-
tion of its support for the military actions in Afghanistan, stating that it considered
it as its obligation to do so as a member of the United Nations. Of course, one must
not overlook the fact that in accepting the collective approach under Chapter VII,
the United States would be subject to some restraints of their freedom of action as
they perceive to possess it. But this loss in political choices would be outweighed by
far by the gains in political respect for the United States on the part of the interna-
tional community, in general, and by the gains with regard to the successful exercise
of its political leadership within the framework of the United Nations, in particular.
II. There is also widespread consensus with regard to the second major element
of a comprehensive strategy against global terrorism, i'e. the necessity of arresting
and prosecuting those persons who have committed acts of terrorism. In view of the
universal condemnation of terrorist acts, one could rightly consider such acts to con-
stitute crimes against humanity. 2 Thus, such acts are not acts of war but simply
crimes for which individuals are liable and subject to criminal prosecution - be it
under domestic or international jurisdiction, if such is available. As the International
Criminal Court is not yet functioning, there is only the option that the Security
"1 While the use of force by the United States against Libya in 1986 was generally received
critically, the missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 carried out as acts of self-defense
were mostly seen as justified, see Tietje/Nowrot (note 1), 14 with further references; the latter
also met with strong criticism, particularly in the Arab world.
2 See the definition of the crime against humanity in Art. 7 of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, reprinted in: Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 19, 1998, 453 et seq.; also Art.
18 of the Draft International Criminal Code adopted by the International Law Commission
(ILC) in 1996, Yearbook of the ILC, 1996, vol. 1, Part 2, 17, 47; accepting terrorist acts as crimes
against humanity Tomuschat (note 1), 536; Cassese (note 1), section 2, 1 et seq.;Ki'rgis(note 1),
1; Cerone (note 1), 4; Paust (note 1), 8.
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Council sets up an ad hoc Tribunal under Chapter VII UNCh. In view of the
condemnation of international terrorism and the call for the prosecution of the per-
petrators of acts of terrorism, no objections could be raised against the prosecution
of those responsible for the September 11 attacks with regard to the nullum crimen
sine lege and the nulla poena sine lege principles. To establish an ad hoc Tribunal
under the authority of the United Nations, again, would be signal that the fight
against terrorism is a serious concern of the international community. Politically, it
would be a prudent step to take in order to avoid possible charges that individual
states, particularly those affected by the terrorist acts, would not be able to provide
a fair trial to which terrorists - no matter of the seriousness of their crimes - are
entitled. 3 On a positive note, it is to be noted that the Security Council has taken
strong steps to oblige the member states to closely cooperate in the efforts to appre-
hend and prosecute terrorists as a part of the ongoing campaign against terrorism -
steps that seem to meet broad acceptance in the international comunity.
III. A third element of anti-terrorism must be increased efforts to bring to an end
some of the major conflicts besetting several regions of the world. The most impor-
tant among these is the Near East conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
Whether the September 11 attacks were in some way related to the Near East con-
flict is rather immaterial. Overlooking the history of this conflict, one cannot but
recognize the responsibility of the United Nations to play a major role in the efforts
to energetically push the peace process - together, of course, with those countries
that carry a special responsibility, be it as close allies of Israel, be it for historical and
moral reasons as in the case of Germany. It has been said that nothing will be the
same after the September 11 attacks. If this observation is to be more than just
rhetoric, the international community in general and more concretely - and along
the saying that each one should clean its own doorsteps first - the European and
other Western countries should seize the opportunity to step back and make an in-
depth search as to possible mistakes that were made in their foreign policies to-
wards, for example, the Near East.
IV. An indispensable and higly important short- and longterm element of anti-
terrorism consists in increased complimentary efforts to reduce and eventually elim-
inate the glaring disparities in wealth around the globe. As DavidHeldhas aptly ob-
served:
" The question as to the legal status of terrorists captured in the course of the military action
in Afghanistan cannot be dealt with here at length. Only that much may be mentioned: the
rhetoric about war seems to indicate - and in a sense rightly so - that terrorists falling into the
hands the military in Afghanistan should be accorded the status of prisoners of war. In fact,
however, as terrorists they are not regular combatants but ordinary criminals and thus only
entitled to the relevant human rights standards for the treatment of prisoners, as enshrined, e.g.,
in the UN Covenant of Political and Civil Rights, Ga Res. 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966;
see a similar position Tomuschat (note 1), 536.
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"Thus, the complex and differentiated narratives of globalization point in stark and often
contradictory directions. On the one side, there is the dominant tendency of economic
globalization over the last three decades towards a pattern set by the deregulatory, neo-
liberal model; an increase in the exit options of corporate and finance capital relative to
labour and the state, and an increase in the volatility of market responses, which has
exacerbated a growing sense of political uncertainty and risk; and the marked polarization
of global relative inequalities (as well as serious doubt as to whether there has been a 'trickle
down' effect to the world's poorest at all). On the other side, there is the significant
entrenchment of cosmopolitan values concerning the equal dignity and worth of all human
beings; the reconnection of international law and morality; the establishment of regional
and global systems of governance; and growing recognition that the public good - whether
conceived as financial stability, environmemntal protection, or global egalitarianism - re-
quires coordinated multilateral action if it is to be achieved in the longterm."
5 4
Reaping the greatest part of the harvest produced by globalization carries with it the
responsibility to ensure a globalization with a human face. That there is a growing
consciousness of this responsibility was evidenced by the most recent World Eco-
nomic Forum in New York."5 But such consciousness has to develop within the
societies of the first world countries at large. It has to be part of the anti-terror
strategy that people in these countries realize that they can and have to contribute
to the efforts by accepting that more has to be done in terms of effective develop-
ment aid which in turn would or will affect our daily lives. Furthermore, an effec-
tive anti-terrorism strategy must include a 'crusade' for inter-cultural tolerance and
respect - something that is not to be treated in political rhetoric, but needs to imple-
mented by each individual.
Held (note 3), 9 et seq.
s See address of the World Economic Forum by the IMF President Horst Kdhler on
2 February 2002, cdhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1791000/1797853.stm.
